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  Franchise and Contract Asymmetry:  
A Common Trans-Atlantic Agenda? 
PROF. TIBOR TAJTI (THAYTHY)1 © 
Abstract: Normative legal theories, no matter whether pluralist or 
monist, tend to formulate what the law should be. Based on what values, 
either on a purely theoretical plane, or based on a single or a few para-
digm contracts – the contours of which seem to be most solidified ac-
cording to common opinion – like sales contracts. They fail, however, 
to answer the query about what happens in cases of newer-generation 
contracts, such as franchise contracts, one of the quintessential features 
of which is information and strategic asymmetry. The basic premise of 
this article is that given the European popularity of business format 
franchise originating in the United States (U.S.), asymmetry is a com-
mon concern on both sides of the Atlantic. Moreover, as the franchise 
regulation is in its inception in Europe, the more advanced-United 
States should be relied upon. The main argument of the paper is that 
asymmetry is a sine qua non feature of franchise that should be taken 
into account as a value by normative legal theories. It is also claimed 
that asymmetry could be deconstructed and applied mutatis mutandis to 
other types of contracts as well.  
List of Abbreviations: 
BFA - British Franchise Association 
DCFR - Draft Common Frame of Reference (Europe) 
EU - European Union 
FTC - Federal Trade Commission (U.S.) 
IFA - International Franchise Association 
UCC - Uniform Commercial Code (U.S.) 
UNIDROIT - International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
Gillian K. Hadfield: “Franchising is a significant and problematic force in such areas as 
antitrust, product liability, intellectual property, securities and agency law. Most im-
 
 1. Professor of law and Chair of the International Business Law Program at Central Euro-
pean University, Legal Studies Department, Budapest, Hungary (< http://www.ceu.hu >). Contact 
email < tajtit@ceu.edu >; telephone (CEU office): +36 1 327 3275. The author would like to ex-
press his gratitude to Alexandra Horvathova and Patricia Živković for help in research related to 
this article. The views expressed herein are entirely attributable to the author and they do not nec-
essarily reflect the position of CEU. 
TAJTI_FINAL_FOR_PRINTER(WITH ABBREVIATION LIST (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/2016  2:09 PM 
246 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 37:245 
portantly, however, franchising is problematic for contract law. . .” 
[Albeit, especially in the United States, it has become] increasingly regulated . . . the heart 
of franchising’s legal structure is still contract.” (Emphasis added.)
2
 
I. INTRODUCTION: WHY FOCUS ON CONTRACT ASYMMETRY? 
A. The Subjective Agenda or why I have become interested in Contract 
Asymmetry 
Even if unrevealed, concrete reasons tend to explain the interest of 
scholars in the topics they choose to explore. In the case of the author of 
this paper, two such reasons and the resulting ramifications will be 
shown in this paper. The primary reason was a Polish high court case3 I 
came to read as a co-editor of one of the rare Continental European case 
law books in English.4 Being especially interested in the fate of auton-
omously-spreading successful franchise transplants from the North 
American continent (or more precisely, the so-called business format 
franchise),5 this case intrigued me because its central issues were 
whether asymmetry is a natural corollary of franchise contracts; and if 
so, what level of asymmetry should be tolerated by the law?6 The case 
was additionally interesting because it did not arise between a major 
U.S. franchisor and a mom-and-pop-type local franchisee, but was an 
indigenous Polish fledgling venture. As franchises were neither regulat-
ed by the Polish Civil Code, nor regulated by any law, the court was ex-
 
 2. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete 
Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 929, 938-39 (1990). 
 3. Decision of the Court of Appeal of Katowice, No. I ACa 636/98 (Mar. 4, 1998) (Pol).  
 4. Krzysytof Kaźmierczyk & Filip Kijowski, Enforcement of Contracts in Poland, in THE 
CASE LAW OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE – ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTS 532-669 (Stef-
an Messman & Tibor Tajti eds., Eur. Univ. Press 2009). For the franchise case and commentary 
in English, see subsection 8.2.  
 5. See ANDREW KOSTECKA, FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY, 3 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce 
ed., 1985-1987). The discussion herein will be limited to what is known as “business format fran-
chising,” defined by the US Department of Commerce as being “characterized by an ongoing 
business relationship between franchisor and franchisee that includes not only the product, ser-
vice, and trademark, but the entire business format itself – a marketing strategy and plan, operat-
ing manuals and standards, quality control, and continuing two-way communications.” 
 6. The number of cases involving franchise-related disputes in Europe is small. No more 
than a handful cases focus on franchise-asymmetry, or touch upon that aspect of franchise. Still, 
the mentioned Polish one is hardly the only one. For example, the Finnish Supreme Court dealt 
with the enforceability of an arbitration clause in a franchise agreement in 1996. For a synopsis of 
the case, see Jouko Huhtala et al., Validity of Arbitration Clauses, INT’L LAW OFFICE (Mar. 11, 
2004), http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=175c2dfb-61d2-48ae-
a403-53e00908f4a2. Examples can also be found outside Europe. See, e.g., the Canadian case 
Ellis v. Subway Franchise Systems of Canada Ltd., 2000 CarswellOnt 1659 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. 
J.). 
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pected to grasp the essence of franchises from secondary sources of law. 
The franchisees (plaintiffs), among others, claimed that because of the 
asymmetry all risks shifted to them, their hands were tied and that there 
was no “equivalency of performance.”7 Reversing the first court’s deci-
sion, the appellate court, however, sided with the franchisors and pro-
claimed asymmetry to be a normal feature of franchise contracts, mak-
ing it reconcilable with contractual freedom.8 
Such hesitancy and indeterminacy in Europe should not be puz-
zling because franchises in many jurisdictions are still “new kid[s] on 
the block.”9 When the author in this paper was presenting on this partic-
ular topic, lawyers (typically from Continental legal systems) tended to 
be skeptical about the outcome of the Polish case as opposed to faculty 
from business schools – in particular experts of marketing.  Put simply, 
while in the field of academia, franchises are still veiled with a degree 
of ignorance and misconceptions, in the world of businesses that is not 
necessarily so. For these reasons, during the ensuing years it became 
natural to the author of this paper to be more sensitive to the issue of 
contractual balance. 
Notwithstanding the indeterminacy surrounding business format 
franchise especially in jurisdictions lacking franchise-specific laws, 
court and arbitral cases are bringing problems that have already been 
seen and decided upon in the U.S. Issues linked to asymmetry, are grad-
ually appearing in Europe as well, such as the decision of the German 
Higher Regional Court of Thuringia.10  In that decision the Court denied 
the enforcement of an award rendered in the U.S. because of “gross dis-
parity to the disadvantage of the franchisee” inherent to the arbitration 
clause imposed by the franchisor.11 
 
 7. Franchise Agreement, FRANCHISING IN POLAND, 
http://www.franchisinginpoland.com/franchise-law/franchise-agreement (last visited Feb. 21, 
2015); Decision of the Court of Appeal of Katowice, No. I ACa 636/98; Kaźmierczyk & Ki-
jowski, supra note 4, at 654.  
 8. Decision of the Court of Appeal of Katowice, No. I ACa 636/98; see Kaźmierczyk & 
Kijowski, supra note 4, at 655. 
 9. Patrick Mayock, Big Brands Playing the Growth Game in Europe, HOTEL NEWS NOW 
(Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.hotelnewsnow.com/article/14885/Big-Brands-playing%20-the-
growth-game-in-Europe. 
 10. Ana Mercedes López Rodríguez, Lex Mercatoria (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Univ. of Aarhus), available at 
http://law.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_jura/dokumenter/forskning/rettid/artikler/20020046.pdf. 
[hereinafter Lex Mercatoria].  
 11. Subsidiary Company of Franchiser v. Franchisee, in 37 YEARBOOK OF COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 2012, 220, 220 (Kluwer Law Int’l. 2012). As the holding of the decision stated 
“[e]nforcement of [the] ICDR [International Center for Dispute Resolution] an affiliate of the 
American Arbitration Association rendered in the United States was denied because the arbitra-
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The other, ancillary is linked to the world of international com-
mercial law and alternative dispute resolution; in particular, internation-
al commercial arbitration.12 One may safely claim that asymmetry is not 
necessarily of relevance only in the context of business format fran-
chise. Not necessarily on the front pages of contract or conflicts of law 
textbooks, yet parties from different jurisdictions wanting to choose a 
law sometimes would like to identify and choose a properly balanced 
law.13 Yet, despite the parties’ intent and wishes, there is neither a test 
nor criteria to be used to determine whether the resulting contracts and 
laws used are balanced. In the lack of a generally applicable acid test, 
one is forced to rely on case-by-case improvisations in the quest for bal-
ance. 
As no proper explanation or test has been developed, neither on 
franchise asymmetry, nor on what balanced laws (e.g., sales) mean, a 
closer exploration of the topic is more than justified. However, due to 
the current gap in scholarship, this article is inevitably seminal, and thus 
of an exploratory nature. As a consequence, not only do the contours of 
the central category of the ensuing elaboration remain fluid; but also, 
the concomitant practical and theoretical questions. 
B. The Objective Agendas 
Personal curiosities aside, contract asymmetry is far from being 
merely a fiction. In fact, contract asymmetry is a suitable subject for an 
inextricably complex theory. Contract asymmetry is a complex problem 
that creates a number of concrete tasks for legal scholars of both, practi-
cal and theoretical dimensions. Moreover, due to the global nature of 
the topic, it should be relevant to both sides of the Atlantic. 
1. The Central Query: Franchise Asymmetry 
A closer look at business format franchise reveals that asymmetry 
is a distinguishing characteristic of franchise contracts. Marketing ex-
perts more readily state that asymmetry is indeed a sine qua non of this 
particular contract. To the business world it is natural that the franchisor 
ought to have robust control rights, often amounting to the right to dic-
 
tion clause in the franchise contract, which provided mandatorily for a New York venue for the 
arbitration hearing, created a gross disparity to the disadvantage of the franchisee, a small Ger-
man entrepreneur, and was therefore invalid under the Liechtenstein law, which applied to the 
arbitration agreement by an implied choice.” 
 12. Lex Mercatoria, supra note 10. 
 13. PAUL FRIEDLAND & LOUKAS MISTELIS, 2010 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: 
CHOICES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 14 (Sch. Int’l Arb., Queen Mary, Univ. of London 
ed., 2010). 
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tate virtually everything that is crucial to the franchisee. The business 
world would argue that the asymmetry is necessary for the proper pro-
tection of intellectual property rights and is also the key to the success 
of the entire system; even if the degree of asymmetry is far from being 
one and the same in the context of the prohibitive variety of franchises. 
Legal scholars – less in the U.S. and more in Europe – tend to be more 
hesitant to draw a conclusion on the meaning and relative weight of 
asymmetry. It might be legitimately speculated that this is to a great ex-
tent because of the continued rivalry of monist and pluralist contract 
theories. However, the existence and the important role asymmetry 
plays in the context of franchise should go uncontested.  
Europe has undergone significant changes with regards to fran-
chises, and is looking for the right franchise law formula for asymmetry 
for two very practical imminent reasons.14 On the one hand, due to the 
quintessential role civil codes (codification) play in the Continental sys-
tems, it is pivotal to consider whether to make a nominated contract out 
of franchise. If the answer is yes, what contours should be enshrined in 
the codes? On the other hand, in some jurisdictions the quest for the 
definition of franchise was prompted by regulatory reasons, namely the 
need to react to abuses. Unfortunately, the national systems’ responses 
and the lack of guidance from Brussels amount to a cavalcade of restric-
tive and varied franchise laws. Such laws have additionally been crip-
pled by the fact that the question whether mandatory rules-based regula-
tion or rather the private law route should be elected has not been fixed 
yet. In some strong franchise jurisdictions only industry ethical stand-
ards (if any) govern. The common denominator of all the systems is that 
none of them has specifically identified asymmetry as a key corollary of 
franchise. In fact, one could not safely predict based on any of the laws 
what asymmetry is and what level of it should be tolerated. 
The same could be concluded with respect to the recent code-like 
soft law instrument, the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR).15 
The DCFR came forward with presumably Europe’s first complete set 
 
 14. Nick Pimlott & Martin Mendelsohn, Reform of European Union Rules on Distribution, 
FRANCHISING WORLD (Jan. 2010), http://www.franchise.org/Franchise-Industry-News-
Detail.aspx?id=49352. 
 15. The text of DCFR can be downloaded from < 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/dcfr_outline_edition_en.pdf >. On the features, fate 
and a discussion on the DCFR franchise law, See Tibor Tajti, Systemic and Topical Mapping of 
the Relationship of the DCFR and Arbitration KAZIMIRO SIMONAVIČIAUS UNIV., VILNIUS, 
LITHUANIA, (2013). Note that the DCFR is nothing else but soft law, the idea that it could be 
transformed into Europe’s first common civil code was dropped by the EU. See also Tibor Tajti, 
The Unfathomable Nature and Future of the European Private Law Project, 2 CHINA-EU L.J. 69-
95 (2013). 
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of systematized rules on this contract.16 One could easily see that a fran-
chisor-favoring asymmetry is recognized indirectly – adding up the 
meaningfully bigger number and more onerous obligations imposed on 
the franchisee – nowhere do the comments of the drafters (an elite pool 
of European Union private law scholars) note how meaningful a role 
asymmetry plays in the context of the new-comer franchise contract. 
Because the business format franchise originated in the United 
States17, it is only natural to turn to the rich American history of this 
contract, including franchise regulation, the answers provided by courts 
adjudicating based on contract law, and eventually what contract theory 
says on the matter. Contrary to Europe, in the United States control is 
generally spoken of, one can identify a pro-industry (franchisor) and 
pro-franchisee scholarship18 together with a meaningful literature touch-
ing upon or departing from various concrete elements of asymmetry 
(even if named differently). Nevertheless, even American law seems to 
be devoid of proper answers to the issues faced by the Polish Appeal 
Court19: what is franchise asymmetry and what degree of it does the law 
tolerate? Thus, the issue of franchise and general contract asymmetry 
should be relevant to U.S. scholars too. 
2. The Ancillary Query: Balanced Contracts 
Going beyond the franchise context, there is a call to explore the 
possibility of applying the yet-to-be developed franchise asymmetry 
tests to other types of contracts. In other words, it could be validly sus-
tained that the relevance of contract asymmetry is far from limited to 
the franchise relationship. No better illustration could be served than a 
brief look at the international scene, where the negotiating parties com-
 
 16. Study Group on a European Civil Code & Research Group on EC Private Law (Acquis 
Group), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, DRAFT COMMON 
FRAME OF REFERENCE, 4 (Outline ed., 2009). 
 17. ELIZABETH CRAWFORD SPENCER, THE REGULATION OF FRANCHISING IN THE NEW 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 1 (Oxford Univ. Press) 
 18. For an example of articles clearly reflecting the divide, see Paul Steinberg & Gerald 
Lescatre, Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 105, 
113 (2004), where the authors identify David J. Kaufmann as a publisher that mainly represents 
the franchisors’ positions after having become “politically astute” and “found[ing] the leading 
law firm in the country specializing in franchisor representation.” Id. at 271. The title of the arti-
cle by Peter C. Lagarias and Robert S. Boulter should speak for itself and for the position it takes: 
The Modern Reality of the Controlling Franchisor: the Case for More, Not Less, Franchisee Pro-
tections, 29 FRANCHISE L.J. 139 (2010). See also Robert W. Emerson & Uri Benoliel, Can Fran-
chisee Associations Serve as a Substitute for Franchisee Protection Laws?, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 
99 (2013) (questioning the idea that independent franchise associations, which exist in Germany 
and UK, can efficiently prevent franchisor opportunism.).  
 19. Decision of the Court of Appeal of Katowice, No. I ACa 636/98. 
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ing from different jurisdictions try to agree on the application of a “bal-
anced law.”20 Although some major international contracts seem to have 
rested on a “balanced” or “non-asymmetric” law, one may wonder on 
the basis of what exact criteria (if any) the selection has been made, de-
spite the lack of a commonly accepted test for “measuring” and “deter-
mining” asymmetry. 
Invoking not just rich experiences with franchise law, but also the 
praise of the “American policy of inadequate bargaining power,” re-
ferred to by Lord Denning in the famous English case of Lloyds Bank 
Ltd v. Bundy,21  United States contract law scholars seem to be justifi-
ably expected to react to the challenge and come forward with proper 
answers to the modest yet practical questions raised herein. 
C. The Hypotheses and the Roadmap to the Article 
This article rests on a number of hypotheses. First and foremost, 
asymmetry is a neglected yet quintessential feature of franchise as a sui 
generis type new-generation contract, the existence of which has been 
both presumed and targeted occasionally by regulation, notwithstanding 
its inherent vagueness. Secondly, asymmetry, as such, could be dissect-
ed. Based on the resulting cognitive achievements, a test of asymmetry 
could be formulated along with a suitable normative contract theory, 
more specifically, a pluralist and franchise-specific type. 
In light of the above, this article will first try to circumscribe the 
notion of asymmetry and delimit it from the most important overlapping 
and neighboring categories of law. Thereafter, the second and “pragmat-
ic” section will be aimed at illuminating more closely what real dilem-
mas surround contract asymmetry by taking business format franchise 
 
 20. See FRIEDLAND, supra note 13. The Queen Mary International Arbitration Study of 
2010 found, for example, that when the bargaining power of the parties is equal (and none could 
impose home law and courts), “Swiss law is the neutral law par excellence;” even though only 37 
percent of the interviewees were from Europe.; see Stefan Vogenauer, Regulatory Competition 
through Choice of Contract Law and Choice of Forum in Europe: Theory and Evidence, in 
REGULATORY COMPETITION IN CONTRACT LAW AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 246 (Horst Ei-
denmüller ed., Oxford Univ. 2013) (citing The Oxford/Clifford Chance European Contract Law 
Survey (2005). 
 21. See Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Bundy, [1975] Q.B. 326, 333 (Eng.). Inadequate bargaining 
power would exist “when the parties have not met on equal terms – when the one is so strong in 
bargaining power and the other so weak – that, as a matter of common fairness, it is not right 
that the strong should be allowed to push the weak to the wall.” Id. at 336-37. “However, the case 
was about a personal guarantee of father to support his son’s company and Lord Denning’s view 
was eventually rejected because “the lengths to which American courts have gone in implement-
ing this policy would hardly be acceptable in England without express legislative authority.” See 
EDWIN PEEL, TREITEL ON THE LAW OF CONTRACT § 10-049, at 408 (Sweet & Maxwel, 13th ed. 
2011). 
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contracts as benchmarks. This article will review the evolution of fran-
chise law in the United States and the franchise law of Europe, which 
obviously lags behind. It will be shown that the dilemmas surrounding 
control and contract asymmetry have always been presumed and reacted 
upon; the latter being characteristic primarily of the United States and 
much less so of Europe. The third, and “theoretical” section, will briefly 
summarize what contract theories have achieved so far. The conclusions 
rest on the hypothesis that exploring contract theory could ease the ten-
sion stemming from the indeterminacy of asymmetry, be it for the sake 
of increased predictability, economic efficiency, protection of the weak-
er party or simply to help regulators and lawmakers. With these pre-
sumptions in mind, this article ultimately concludes that deconstruction 
of asymmetry, and on basis of that, forging of a proper normative con-
tract theory is not just desirable but possible as well. 
II. ASYMMETRY DEFINED 
A. Delimiting the Scope of Inquiry: Franchise Asymmetry as Benchmark 
Notwithstanding the relative importance of global contract theo-
ries, nothing prevents concurrent support for a franchise-specific plural-
ist normative contract theory on asymmetry – the primary focus of this 
article. In lieu of searching for a global contract theory, for one applica-
ble to all contract types, the focus is narrowed down to franchise con-
tracts. The exploration of the possible application of findings to other 
types of contracts, whether for closer clarification of what balanced con-
tracts are or for any other reasons, awaits other scholars. Put simply, a 
paradigm business franchise contract is the benchmark. 
Therefore, the primary point of departure for the purposes of this 
article is that a franchise contract is characterized by a meaningful, 
gross-inequality of the parties, clearly tilting the balance to the benefit 
of franchisors. This tilt in favor of the franchisor is also normally re-
flected in the provisions of the underlying contract, which then qualify 
as asymmetric contracts. The franchisor’s right to encroach and estab-
lish additional outlets in the neighborhood or in the close vicinity of the 
franchisee might be a suitable example that is normally explicitly pro-
vided for. This means that we will try to take a look at franchise asym-
metry primarily from the perspectives of drafters of franchise contracts, 
as well as franchise law regulators. Considering encroachment as a suit-
able example, the issue of whether the franchisor’s right to encroach is a 
tolerable form of asymmetry, or whether laws should either exclude it 
or limit it, becomes apparent. 
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It is fair to say that literature has so far focused on understanding 
and explaining the nature of franchise. This literature has included dis-
cussions pointing to information and strategic asymmetry.22 Presently, 
most franchise laws tackle only the former through mandatory or quasi-
mandatory disclosure.23  Based on the still modest but growing number 
of publications approaching franchise from a comparative perspective 
and the topics they typically focus upon, it may be concluded that a 
relatively wide consensus has been reached only with respect to the first 
type of asymmetry.24 This protection is inherently limited given that it 
“is aimed primarily at preventing abuses or surprises in the contractual 
formation stage, rather than in the [later] termination stage.”25 Strategic 
asymmetry – which some scholars attribute to the relational nature of 
franchise26 – unquestionably plays a key role in the life of franchise. 
Yet, one could hardly speak of a consensus among scholars.  Much of 
what follows will result from the effect that strategic asymmetry has on 
franchise.27 
B. The Fluid Pool of Overlapping and Competing Designations 
Contract asymmetry is a fluid concept. It has often been discussed 
without having been firmly defined.28  An exacerbating factor is that the 
term itself has been subsumed under some other similarly amorphous 
terms. One of them is the category of ‘‘neutral law;” a reference to such 
 
 22. Rosa Lapiedra, et al., Managing asymmetry in Franchise Contracts: Transparency as 
the Overriding Rule, 1488, Management Decision. Vol. 50, Iss. 8 (2012). 
 23. Reference is made to industrial self-regulations, which provide for disclosure, yet – be-
cause of the very nature of these sources of law – their enforcement is left to the industries them-
selves. This is far from the mandatory rules of regulations normally passed by legislation. 
 24. See Lapiedra supra note 22; See e.g. Spencer supra note 17. 
 25. Pannal Alan Sanders, “At Will” Franchise Terminations and the Abuse of Rights Doc-
trine, 42 LA. L. REV. 209, 215  (1981). Although Sander’s claim was made in 1981, it remains 
valid today. 
 26. See, in particular, Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law 
of Incomplete Contracts, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 927 (April 1990), at 991 concluding that franchise con-
tracts are ‘highly incomplete,’ especially because the parties cannot “specify how the parties are 
to exercize [the franchisor’s powers].” Such incomplete contracts are therefore incapable of con-
trolling franchisor opportunism that mainly stems from its superior strategic position. 
 27. See PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 934-
36 (Oxford Univ. Press 1997). 
 28. Id. at 934 (Oxford Univ. Press 1997). Illustrative in that respect is the venerable text-
book on EU Law by Craig and Búrca when dealing with the relationship of franchise and compe-
tition law obiter admits that “[i]t is of the essence of franchise that the franchisor will require the 
franchisee to comply with certain standards and methods of sale for the product in question” and 
“[it] is also central to the franchising system that the franchisor be enabled to impose terms 
which serve to protect the intellectual-property rights which have been assigned to the franchi-
see.”  
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a system of norms which have achieved some equilibrium. 29 On an ab-
stract level, obviously the products of neutral laws are balanced, in 
comparison to asymmetric contracts. The problem, already hinted at, is 
that theories on neutral law remain abstract, rest on indeterminate crite-
ria, and are hardly panacea to the franchise query. 
Some authors have spoken of franchises as one-sided contracts, 
characterized by the “gross inequality in bargaining power which usual-
ly exists between the franchisee and the more powerful franchisor” 
which is “the primary source of abuse”30  Yet, if we stick with Bebchuk 
and Posner’s definition, defining one-sided contracts as “contracts con-
taining terms that impose a greater expected cost on one side than bene-
fit on the other,”31 one could see that one-sided and asymmetric con-
tracts could be taken as full equivalents only if subscribing to the view 
of law and economics that everything could eventually be expressed in 
terms of a cost-benefit analysis. Such a proposition requires the use of 
mathematical formulas: a dead-end. Referring back to our Polish case, 
such math-based cost analysis hardly could be expected from judges 
charged with the task of determining what asymmetry is concretely, and 
to what degree it should be tolerated.32 This paper proposes a simpler, 
math-free test, which simply tries to answer the question: Is contracting 
for the franchisor’s right to encroach as an asymmetric power belonging 
only to one party to the contract tolerable? 
Factors that further contribute to blurring the picture are that courts 
combating asymmetry took opposing views: some saw asymmetric con-
tracts as nothing else but a type of adhesion contracts, while others 
viewed franchise as contracts made by merchants standing on equal 
footing, and thus intervention for the protection of the weaker party is 
not justified.33 Contrary to earlier scholarship, today the prevailing opin-
ion is that the picture is much more nuanced and that franchise dilem-
 
 29. FRIEDLAND, supra note 13 (finding that when the bargaining power of the parties is 
equal and none could impose home law and courts); “Swiss law is the neutral law par excel-
lence;” even though only 37 per cent of the interviewees were from Europe; See Vogenauer, su-
pra note 20, at 251. 
 30. Sanders, supra note 25, at 212-13. 
 31. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consum-
er Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 827 (2006).  
 32. Kaźmierczyk & Kijowski, supra note 4. 
 33. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. A.A. Gold, 357 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1974). In the case, the contract 
gave the right to the franchisor to evict the franchisee on 10 days notice. The court – referring to 
the 19th century case Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Simpson, 19 Law Rep. 462, 465 
(1875) (held that “men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of 
contracting”). For critique of the decision, see Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 18. 
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mas cannot be resolved by resorting to rules on adhesion contracts.34  
For one thing, the category of adhesion contracts is broader than and 
qualitatively different from the category of asymmetric contracts.35  Fur-
ther, it is a fact that an additional layer of protective tools has developed 
since the 1970s to specifically protect franchisees, which can be indi-
rectly taken as evidence that the rules on adhesion contracts were clear-
ly insufficient.36 It is commonly recognized that “contract law has 
[failed] to forge adequate tools for coping with contracts of adhesion.”37 
It may be speculated that this is partly attributable to non-differentiation 
of various one-sided contracts – including the asymmetric ones. Name-
ly, the rules on adhesion contracts were also coined based on conven-
tional, one-shot type contracts (the so-called “discrete transactions”),38 
whereas franchise belongs to the category of long-term relational con-
tracts. 
The category of exploitative contracts may as well come into pic-
ture at this junction. Aside from the obvious linkage of the two, one 
cannot but conclude that distinct problems are corollary to them. If ex-
ploitation “demarcates the line between legitimate and objectionable 
forms of advantage taking in contract bargaining encounters,”39  exploi-
tative contracts, therefore, are those that transgress a thin line – in our 
case, the tolerable level of asymmetry. The issue is how to determine a 
tolerable level of asymmetry, considering the lack of a test for asym-
metry.  Furthermore, not all asymmetric contracts are inherently exploi-
tative. In other words, it may be argued that the tolerable level of 
asymmetry – if a test, which this article is looking for, is formulated – 
may be also the litmus test for determining the threshold that divides 
exploitative asymmetric contracts from their innocent brethren. 
Put simply, it is one of the contentions of this article that a distinct 
 
 34. Bebchuk, supra note 31, at 828. As Bebchuk and Posner put it, though speaking of 
standard form consumer contracts filled with boilerplates: “An older, and pretty well discredited, 
scholarly literature thought the absence of bargaining showed that the seller must have monopoly 
power, enabling him to foist on consumers whatever terms he liked.” 
 35. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 318-19 (7th ed. 1999). For example, Black’s Law Diction-
ary points to consumers as typical “weaker parties” when defining adhesion contracts as “stand-
ard from contract[s] prepared by one party, to be signed by the party in a weaker position, usually 
a consumer, who has little choice about the terms.” 
 36. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §1.7 at 20-21 (4th ed. 2004). Compared 
to banking, insurance, transportation or communications, regulation of the franchise industry is 
less intensive even in the most activist regulatory jurisdictions; still the trend seems to be similar 
even if slower and less intense.  
 37. See JOHN D. CALAMARI AND JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §1.5, at 15 
(4th ed. 1998). 
 38. Id.  
 39. See RICK BIGWOOD, Exploitative Contracts 130 (2003). 
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category of asymmetric contracts should be recognized by theory. More 
precisely, the pair of asymmetric versus balanced contracts deserves a 
place in contract law. Asymmetric contracts differ from the competing 
categories of adhesion, exploitative, and other contract categories. The 
main justification for arguing that a distinct place in contract law should 
exist is the fact that forcing them under the same roof would not bring 
fruit to the very problems inherent to paradigm asymmetric contracts of 
the franchise sort. For example, both the conclusion of a contract by 
purchasing a ticket to make use of the service of the Tube in London 
and a fast food franchise contract may qualify as an adhesion contract, 
but they radically differ on a number of distinguishing criteria and 
linked policy issues. 
III. THE PRAGMATIC AGENDA: THE FRANCHISE SAGA 
A. Franchise in the United States 
1. A Brief Account of the History of Franchise in the United States 
The United States is not only universally cited as the cradle of 
business format franchising; it also continues to host one of world’s 
largest franchise industry.40  This includes an unprecedentedly powerful 
and internationally active group of franchisors commonly looked upon 
as benchmarks for what this business model is supposed to resemble all 
over the world, albeit the earliest cited franchisor-abuse case stems from 
the heydays of American automobile industry.41 Only traditional con-
tract doctrines, then existing tort law and other classical branches of law 
– as supplemented by equity – could have been employed to protect (if 
at all) the vulnerable franchisees until the early 1970s denoting the arri-
val of the still ongoing regulatory era. As opposed to the pre-1970 clas-
sical era, characterized by remedies predominantly having ex post ef-
fects, regulations are featured primarily by legal paraphernalia of ex 
ante nature42 This distinction is of crucial importance because the fran-
chisee, who is about to invest all his life savings or has already lost all 
 
 40. See IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, FRANCHISE BUSINESS ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: MAY 2012 1 
(2012), available at http://emarket.franchise.org/BusinessOutlookReport2012.pdf; see also 
SPENCER, supra note 17, at 1. According to a recent study, 748,680 franchise establishments, 
8,106 million jobs, provision of goods and services worth $781 billion and contribution to GDP 
worth $461 billion could be linked to business format franchise. 
 41. See Ellis v. Dodge Bros., 246 F. 764 (5th Cir. 1917) (where the fate of a precarious in-
vestment of an Atlanta franchisee was decided upon regarding unfair termination expressly per-
mitted by the underlying agreement).  
 42. See Roy Kreitner, The Future of Contract Theory: On the New Pluralism in Contract 
Theory, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 915, 929 (2012). 
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his franchise-investments due to the abuses or opportunistic behavior of 
the franchisor, is hardly in the position, financially and strategically, to 
launch a time-consuming expensive litigation; especially given the 
vague exceptionally applicable contract law principles. The resistance 
of the franchise industry against regulations is perhaps the best indirect 
proof of the regulations having “sharper teeth.” Thus, the essence of the 
regulations is mandatory rules coupled with enforcement (primarily) by 
dedicated governmental agencies. 
For our purposes, it suffices to assume that two main franchise-
regulatory models have been designed in the U.S.: the weaker disclo-
sure laws and their stronger kin, the ‘franchise relationship’ laws43 Both 
aim to counterbalance the franchisor-benefitting asymmetry inherent to 
franchising. They differ on two main points. First, while the disclosure 
variants cover only the phase preceding the conclusion of the franchise 
contract, the latter extend also to the post-sale relationship. Second, 
notwithstanding the state-level variations, all disclosure systems merely 
ensure that the prospective franchisee is informed of a select number of 
key issues in the franchisor’s offer. Franchise relationship laws, on the 
other hand, are much more “paternalistic,” resulting in the aggregate ef-
fect of much more protection to the franchisee. However, relationship 
laws exist only in a handful of the states – led by California, Maryland 
and Iowa, which are deemed to be the most protective systems – and 
these laws are not setting a trend in other jurisdictions in the United 
States or abroad.44 
These facts are, however, of key importance not just for the US. 
First and foremost, American franchisors are responsible for the spread-
ing and transplantation of highly standardized franchise terms and con-
ditions. Consequently, approaches similar to the American franchising 
practices have manifested all over the world, ensuring that worldwide 
franchise law rests on similar (if not identical) foundations. It is hardly 
an exaggeration to claim that franchising has become a sui generis form 
of true lex mercatoria (or a-national law).45 The natural repercussion of 
this is that foreign lawmakers and arbitrators – and perhaps to a lesser 
extent also foreign courts – may look to U.S. law as a source of inspira-
tions.46 Another, rarely discussed consequence of American dominance 
in the realms of franchise, is the transposition of American domestic 
 
 43. Larry A. DiMatteo, Strategic Contracting: Contract Law as a Source of Competitive 
Advantage, 47 Am. Bus. L.J. 727, 749 (2010), 
 44. Franchise Agreement, supra note 7.  
 45. Lex Mercatoria, supra note 10, at 47. 
 46. Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 18, at 273. 
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theories on the international scene.47 In other words, franchise trends in 
the United States are relevant to the global community. 
2. The Regulatory versus the Contract Law Agenda 
Based on the above, one could conclude that the law on franchise 
is in turmoil in the United States. Misleadingly, one may get the impres-
sion that the central issue has been narrowed down to how much regula-
tion is needed. Consequently, the role of contract law has been reduced 
to the level of supplementary legal aids that could remedy only the ex-
ceptional cases that reach courts. Alternatively, as the proponents of 
regulation of the most far reaching relationship law-type state, “reliance 
on judicial or arbitral application of equitable principles is insufficient, 
and statutory mandates are required to make franchisors responsible for 
the consequences of opportunistic behavior.”48 The full picture is, how-
ever, that three layers of franchise laws could be differentiated in the 
United States: the most important being regulations passed on the feder-
al and state levels (the first layer), as supplemented by industrial self-
regulation (second layer), and classical branches of law (third layer). 
What is puzzling is the fluid nature of franchise asymmetry, a 
common ground for both the regulatory and the classical contract layers. 
Additionally, none of the franchise laws deny the legitimacy of fran-
chise asymmetry. This includes even the farthest reaching relationship 
laws, which aim only to counter and prevent the potential abuses by 
franchisors rather than swinging back the balance-pendulum. Specific 
limitations – like California limiting resort to arbitration – are the ex-
ception rather than the rule.49 Remarkably, the system survives and 
grows notwithstanding its obscure complexities, including  our central 
question of what level of asymmetry should be tolerated. 
When, for example, Steinberg and Lescatre forcefully vouch for 
more regulation (“statutory mandates”), they categorically request also 
taking into account, among others, “the nature of franchise contracts,”50 
 
 47. See Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 18, at 273. Steinberg and Lescatre mentioned the 
example of International Franchise Association’s (IFA) role played on the international scene, 
which was aimed at “ensur[ing] that overseas legislation, if any, covers only the brief period pri-
or to the signing of the franchise agreement and not the franchise relationship itself, which can 
last for a period of 20 years or more.” This included also its impact on the final output of 
UNIDROIT – the Guide to International master Franchise Arrangements (now existing in its 2nd 
version from 2007). According to these experts, albeit IFA proclaims to equally represent both 
franchisors and franchisees, that is nothing more than “self-proclaimed neutrality.” 
 48. Id. at 113. 
 49. Id. at 251. 
 50. Id. at 114. 
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yet without clarifying what that concretely entails. They do list the rela-
tional nature,51 the often-present concerns of vulnerability known to 
consumer protection laws,52 the legitimacy of franchisor discretion53 and 
the “element of uncertainty” inherent to the introduction of such ab-
stract principles as “good faith and fair dealing.”54 Despite acknowl-
edgement of all these issues, the question of the tolerable level of 
asymmetry has not addressed. Moreover, they admit that a living pattern 
of “balanced contracts” is already in place in America: the one applica-
ble to the auto and petroleum industries “provid[ing] all parties with a 
profitable relationship.”55 True, IFA denies and objects to the idea of 
transposition of the same pattern to other types of franchises.56 These 
corroborate the conclusion that balanced franchise legislation does oc-
cur in the United States. 
B. Franchise in Europe 
1. A Brief Account of the History of Franchise in Europe 
Few would contest that in Europe business format franchise is a 
business contract imported from the U.S., the first pioneering variants of 
which first appeared in the UK in the 1950’s and from the 1960’s on in 
other Western European countries.57 By the 1990s, Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) had also joined the club and the spreading of franchise 
continues virtually throughout Europe even today.58 
The quantitative data for any of the last few years, however, 
proves that Europe is far from meaningfully exploiting the economic 
potential hidden in franchises. In 2010, for example, the estimated turn-
over of franchised businesses was $863,300 billion in the U.S., while 
the same figure in the EU amounted only to $300 billion.59 This is clear-
ly unsatisfactory bearing in mind that the population of the U.S. is 
 
 51. Id. (presuming under relational contracts “contracts between parties anticipating contin-
uation of a relationship following signing of the contract”). 
 52. Id. at 107. 
 53. Id. at 315. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 315.  
 56. Id. at 315. 
 57. See Philip Mark Abell, The Regulation of Franchising in the European Union 59 (pub-
lished thesis, Queen Mary, Univ. of London) (2011) at 12. Abell listed the following brands: 
Wimpy (UK, 1955), Service Master (UK, 1958), Golden Egg Restaurants (UK, 1965), Dyno Rod 
(UK, 1966), Ihr Platz (Germany, drugstore), Nordsee (Germany, fish restaurant). In Germany, the 
process intensified after reunification in 1991. [hereinafter Abell Thesis] 
 58. Id. at 37. 
 59. MARK ABELL, THE LAW AND REGULATION OF FRANCHISING IN THE EU 26 (Elgar, 
2013). 
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roughly 60% of the population of EU and that the GDP of the U.S. is 
also lower.60 Moreover, franchising is unevenly present throughout parts 
of the EU.61  Special governmental programs aimed at boosting fran-
chises are the exception, rather than the rule.62 Even though this unful-
filled agenda is increasingly noted, Brussels has not taken any concrete 
steps.63 Surprisingly, this lag might turn out to be the key reason for 
making franchising a priority agenda item. 
2. The Distinguishing Features of European Franchise Laws 
Canvassing the broader picture is pivotal before jumping to the is-
sue of asymmetry. Because franchise as a business model is in the pro-
cess of development, much less scholarly or industrial publications are 
available in Europe compared to the U.S. This applies especially to the 
level of the EU because – with the exception of the Draft Common 
Frame Deference (“DCFR”), which contains quite a promising franchise 
law model – franchise law remains in the bailiwick of national legisla-
tions, leading to substantial differences.64 In contrast, American pro-
franchisor versus the pro-franchisee scholarship is already openly de-
bated.65 This is not necessarily the case in Europe, where basic policy 
issues remain unanswered. Regulatory capture is hardly spoken of 
though the regulation of franchise became part of political games – 
Abell speaks of “political cynicism”66 and populism67 – in some coun-
 
 60. Id. at 49. 
 61. Id. at 20-26.  
 62. See id. at 16. Abell mentioned Italy which has made €350 million available to support 
franchisees with investment grants and soft loans. 
Id. at 286. Abell, who concludes his book with a claim that “[f]ranchising has failed to fulfil its 
potential in the EU [what is] in part due to the regulatory environment.” 
 64. See STUDY GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE & THE RESEARCH GROUP ON 
EXISTING EC PRIVATE LAW, PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN 
PRIVATE LAW 2395 (Christian von Bar & Eric Clive eds., 2010). Franchise is located in DCFR 
Book IV on Specific Contracts under the same roof with commercial agency and distributorship 
(Part E) in the separate chapter 4. Altogether 14 sections are devoted specifically to franchise 
though quite a number of rules apply equally to agency and distributorship. Albeit the comments 
note that “franchise networks are characterized by a much stronger uniformity than ordinary dis-
tribution contracts” control and asymmetry is neither specifically noted nor targeted. However, 
based on the content of most of the provisions it cannot escape attention that the rules attempt to 
find the right balance, however, by recognizing the importance of franchisor control through 
heavily asymmetric set of rights of franchisor and obligations imposed on the franchisee. 
 65. See Steinberg & Lescatre supra note 18, at 271. Steinberg and Lescatre mentioned the 
case of David J. Kaufmann, who while in the shoes of the Deputy Attorney General drafted the 
New York Franchise Act, “a tough disclosure law that remains one of the most comprehensive in 
the U.S.” Later he founded “the leading law firm in the [US] specializing in franchisor represen-
tation,” and has published on franchise yet speaking from a different position. 
 66. ABELL, supra note 59, at 59. 
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tries. 
Another side of the coin is that incomprehension of the nature and 
role of franchise makes lawmakers hesitant to recognize it as a distinct 
nominated contract. This applies especially to the economic engine of 
Europe: Germany, the laws of which otherwise serve as a model for 
quite a number of jurisdictions in Europe.68 The regulatory landscape is 
roughly the same in the UK, another major economy and legal system 
of Europe, with the systemic distinction that codification plays a much 
less important (if any) role in common laws.69 Hence, the issue whether 
to nominate franchise or not is of little (if any) relevance for English (as 
opposed to Scotland with its mixed legal system) lawyers. Needless to 
say, these are directly linked to the following distinguishing features of 
European franchise laws. 
First, the variety of approaches to franchise in Europe is signifi-
cantly bigger than on the other side of the Atlantic. Moreover, it is 
meaningful that in a number of jurisdictions franchise has not been fully 
understood yet. It should not come as a surprise that quite a number of 
them have no franchise-specific law,70 in others they could speak only 
of first generation, not necessarily mature regulations. Second, as the 
countries in which the overwhelming part of European franchise is con-
centrated (in particular Germany and the UK) rely on self-regulation 
(codes of ethics), this could comfortably be taken as the ‘European 
franchise regulatory model.’71 In these systems, in other words, only the 
 
 67. Id. at 60. This was the case in Belgium in which passage of the first franchise statute 
took 24 years and five bills. For example, according to Abell the 2001 bill was brought before the 
parliament as a populist move because the overwhelming part of the franchisors was made of for-
eigners. 
 68. Id. at 40-43, 105. German scholars seem to be lagging behind developments in the econ-
omy because, according to the prevailing view, franchise is not a self-standing ‘nominated’ con-
tract with its own idiosyncratic features. Thus, the discourse is about whether the rules on licens-
ing of IP, service, shareholders’, business management, lease or distribution (agency) could be 
applied by analogy to franchise. See Zsófia Oláh & Csongor István Nagy, Enforcement of Con-
tracts in Hungary, in THE CASE LAW OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE - ENFORCEMENT OF 
CONTRACTS 288-89 (Stefan Messmann & Tibor Tajti eds., 2009). One may legitimately wonder 
how predictable such “franchise law” and how just such a solution is (given that in commercial 
law predictability is what generates justice). Albeit, the new Hungarian Civil Code of 2013 (step-
ping into force on the 15 March 2014) has introduced franchise as a new nominated contract; this 
was not the case earlier. Or, in other words, the law suffered from the same malady as present 
time German law. From the few publicized Hungarian high courts cases, one properly illustrate 
that this level of indeterminacy may be detrimental: in the case the outcome of the case was dif-
ferent depending on whether the rules on commission (due diligence sufficient) rather than under-
taking (achieving a particular result is required) contracts are applied. 
 69. See ABELL, supra note 59, at 217-18. 
 70. See id. at 20. 
 71. See generally id. at 117, 119, 201. 
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vague codes of ethics and general laws (in particular contract and tort 
law) protect (if at all) franchisees.72 It should not come as a surprise 
then, the third distinguishing feature is that in Europe – at least as Abell 
proclaims73 – the prevailing opinion is that the European regulation 
should not be devoted only to protection of franchisees;74 contrary to the 
opinion in the US.75 Fourth, there is no sharp differentiation among the 
three layers of law on franchise in Europe. It is often thought that it does 
not matter whether regulations in a narrower sense (characterized by 
mandatory norms and ex ante protections), mere civil code provisions 
with ex post effects76 or self-regulatory law, apply to franchise.77 A look 
 
 72. See id. at 221. 
 73. See Abell Thesis, supra note 57, at 8. As he put it: “The desirability of protecting the 
rights of franchisees is not disputed within the thesis. However,. . . this should not be the only 
purpose of regulation and that a balance must be struck between the protection of the rights of 
franchisees and the need to re-enforce the economic drivers that encourage both franchisors and 
franchisees to become involved in franchising in the first place. It is suggested that excessive pro-
tection of franchisees can have detrimental effects on both franchising and on the Single Market.” 
 74. See ABELL, supra note 59, at  61-62. This general claim of Abell is hardly substantiated 
and it is not clear on what he has based it. Let us briefly list only the main counter-arguments. 
First, most of the European systems having franchise-specific law have passed those laws, in-
deed, (primarily) to protect the franchisees. This was the case in France, Spain and Sweden hav-
ing faced at least one (if not a series) of abuses. In addition he admits that in France, “Law No. 
89-1008 of 31 December 1989 was adopted due to the proliferation of abuse, sharp practice and 
commercial failure in franchising.” Similar franchisor abuses became major themes of the media 
in Germany (the case of Foto Quelle, Kindervilla – children’s nurseries) and the UK (Self Video 
24). Id. Secondly, the parliamentary debates on the Belgian franchise bills were clearly centered 
around the realization that “franchisors usually offer franchises on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis and 
that there is a clear imbalance between the rights and obligations. . .” ABELL, supra note 59, at 
59. Id. at 289. Thirdly, Abell’s some other major conclusions contradict his own position. In the 
conclusions, for example, he claims, “[while the existent] contractual environment in the EU sup-
ports the economic drivers that encourage franchisors to become involved in franchising. It does 
not adequately support all of the economic drivers that encourage franchisees to become involved 
in franchising.” 
 75. See, e.g., California Franchise Investment Law Preamble (CAL. CORP. CODE § 31001 
(1970)), which reads: “It is the intent of this law to provide each prospective franchisee with the 
information necessary to make an intelligent decision regarding franchises being offered.”  
 76. See, e.g., ABELL, supra note 59, at 292 vouching for EU-wide harmonization either via 
directives or a common European civil code. Mistaking regulations in a narrower sense (i.e., 
mandatory norms enforceable by dedicated agencies ex ante and primarily by regulatory tools) 
with mandatory norms in civil codes (i.e., mandatory norms but enforceable by the private parties 
ex post and offering only injunctions and damages as remedies) is also known. See, e.g., Id. at 68. 
This is a major problem because the chances of litigation and winning of a case by the normally 
mom-and-pop type franchisees are minimal. In other words, unless regulations enforced by dedi-
cated agencies are at place, essentially nothing protects such franchisees from opportunistic be-
havior of franchisors.  
 77. ABELL, supra note 59, at 288. The clear proof that self-regulatory regimes do not work 
is that the BFA has expelled fewer than 5 members in the period of 1997 – 2007. As Abell con-
cluded, and the author of this paper agrees: “[t]he inevitable conclusion . . . is that franchising 
needs to be legally regulated in the EU and that self-regulation lacking transparency, consisten-
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at U.S experiences clearly shows the detrimental effects this shortsight-
edness may have. 
There are a number of points, however, on which European and 
U.S. franchise laws resemble each other, sometimes unusually closely. 
First of all, as a U.S. import, franchise contracts are modeled on con-
tracts used in the U.S. and are thus filled with elements and features 
known on the other side of the Atlantic.78 Such “uniform architecture”79 
means, for example, that a clause allowing for franchisor encroachment 
is a regular corollary of contracts no matter whether the franchisees are 
from Europe or the U.S.80 This is one of the key reasons why one may 
safely presume that franchise contracts are equally asymmetric on both 
sides of the Atlantic, and are thus only minutely affected by the differ-
ent means by which labor and agency law may interfere. 
As Europe builds a form of social-market economy81 and, there-
fore, tends to be more paternalistic, it is fair to claim that the chances of 
such interferences, theoretically, are more realistic in Europe. A similar 
vagueness applies to the way in which the characteristically European 
principles of contract and private law apply to franchise law.82 As these 
function similarly to equitable principles in common laws, it is more re-
alistic to conclude that there is meaningful similarity on this front as 
well. Thus, conclusions related to U.S. law according to which 
“[r]eliance on judicial or arbitral application of equitable principles is 
insufficient, and statutory mandates are required to make franchisors re-
sponsible for the consequences of opportunistic behavior”83 applies mu-
tatis mutandis to the general principles of civil laws. Finally, franchise 
has been on some points linked to investments and, thus, to capital mar-
kets, though in Europe to a lesser extent than in the U.S.84  As a result, 
 
cy, accountability and proportionality will never be able to provide franchisees, potential fran-
chisees or indeed franchisors with the level of protection that they require.” 
 78. See ABELL, supra note 59, § 3.5. As per the samples used by Abell allegedly civil law 
franchise contracts were normally shorter because the parties relied on the code or statutory pro-
visions (where available). However, many civil codes contain no franchise-specific provisions 
and it is doubtful that the large US franchisors appearing on European markets are willing to de-
part from the well-tested patterns applied overseas. Offering such general principles as the Ger-
man general duty of good faith (art. 242 of the German Civil Code as the full-proof supplement of 
detailed contract language, however, is highly dubious). 
 79. Id. at 63, 289. 
 80. ABELL, supra note 59, at 63 and 289. 
 81. Id. at § 3.1.  
 82. Interestingly, while some US authors tend to attribute way too much to these cog-wheels 
of civilian systems, the truth is that only scholars, rather than strings of court or arbitral cases, 
could corroborate such contentions. 
 83. Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 18, at 113. 
 84. See ABELL, supra note 59 at 15. The expansion of franchise was slowed down in the UK 
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protection of franchisees through securities regulation is foreign to Eu-
rope.85 
As far as control and asymmetry in general are concerned, the Eu-
ropean approach is similar to that in the US: they are discussed (rarely, 
if at all)86 as a natural sine qua non of franchise,87 but without even try-
ing to clarify what that means and what the tolerable levels are.88  This 
vagueness is exacerbated by the general immaturity of franchise laws (if 
any), and further exacerbated by unclear policy positions.89 However, if 
one takes the DCFR as representing what the majority of European pri-
vate law experts recommend for Europe (de lege ferenda) – including 
the first more or less full-scale set of systematized provisions on fran-
chise90 – then one could validly claim that the time is ripe for making 
firm policy positions including the fundamental concepts of control and 
asymmetry. 
IV. THE THEORETICAL AGENDA: WHAT CONTRACT THEORY COULD 
OFFER 
Admittedly, a book could be written on what theory could offer to 
franchise and general contract asymmetry. This article illuminates more 
closely what asymmetry means by deconstructing it. First, one such 
seminal model is offered by this article in the next sub-section. Second-
ly, theory could promote, if not a decisive test, then closer guidelines 
based on the outer limits of franchise asymmetry. Third, asymmetry 
 
in the 1960s, indeed, because franchising was liked to pyramid selling (i.e., pyramid and Ponzi 
schemes). To wit, purchasers of franchises (investors) are incentivized to further sell sub-
divisions of the franchise until newcomer investors could be found. Abell was also referring to 
Adams and Pritchard Jones, Franchising: Practice and Precedents – Business Format Franchis-
ing, 1997) Id. at 216. The exclusion of sophisticated franchisees, similarly to FTC Rule’s thresh-
old of US$1 million, resembles the contemporary discussion on the reform of securities disclo-
sure systems as well; subscribed to also by Abell. 
 85. ABELL, supra note 59, § 3.5 
 86. See id. at 244. Abell is right when pointing to the deficiencies of the DCFR, including 
the failure to deal with “the brand, the franchisor’s control of the franchise or the support pro-
vided to the franchisees. . .” (emphasis added). 
 87. See id. at 65. As Abell put it “Control by the franchisor is a key element in the relation-
ship.” 
 88. See id. at 337. Abell lists control as one of the six basic features of franchise (i.e., inde-
pendence of the parties involved, economic interest, a business format, control of the franchisee 
by the franchisor and the provision of assistance to the franchisee) and then obiter makes a claim 
that franchise is characterized by “contractual asymmetry due to the multi-lateral nature of the 
franchise relationship (each franchisor having several/many franchisees) and the long term, dy-
namic and changing nature of the franchisor/franchisee relationship.”; Id. at 55. Then, question-
ably, he sees information asymmetry to be a substantial the risk of the franchisor. 
 89. ABELL, supra note 59, § 3.5 
 90. Id.  
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could legitimize the test based on known normative theories. Given that 
the ultimate task is to find the proper balance, even if asymmetric and 
ensuring franchisor control, pluralist rather than monist theories should 
be employed. The balance is found by relying on efficiency – to support 
the asymmetry benefitting the franchisor – and on the need of the pro-
tection of the weaker party, the franchisee. Finally, on the basis of that, 
theory could explore whether the test of asymmetry could be applied al-
so for other types of contracts or rather it should be uniquely limited on-
ly to franchise contracts. 
A. Asymmetry Deconstructed 
Franchise contracts may serve to dissect asymmetry into its consti-
tutive elements. It is presumed that asymmetry, as an abstract notion, is 
made of concrete, specific, and overlapping elements of varying levels 
of abstraction.91 Various sources emphasize different features and facets 
of the phenomenon, which somewhat blur the picture.92 The presump-
tion – deducted from the aggregate of US franchise law (i.e., all layers 
of law governing franchises) – is that the law recognizes the franchi-
sor’s right to control the franchise system up to a relatively high de-
gree.93 Control, on one hand, rests on asymmetries that are tolerated by 
the system.94 In other words, the level of franchisor’s control recognized 
by a given system is directly commensurate to the number, types, and 
intensity of asymmetries normally expressed in explicit contractual 
clauses, but not all strategic advantages could be directly linked to con-
crete contractual provisions.95 
Three main types of asymmetries could be differentiated: those 
resting (primarily) on specific legal tools (law-based asymmetries), in-
formation (informational asymmetry), and asymmetry derived from the 
superior financial or strategic positions of franchisors (information ver-
sus superior strategic position-based asymmetries).96 Here, admittedly, 
some strategic advantages are inherent in the rights and powers provid-
ed by the franchise contract.97 When a major franchisor negotiates, for 
instance, the franchisor’s superior bargaining position is not exclusively 
 
 91. See generally Rosa Lapiedra, Felipe Palau, & Isabel Reig, Managing asymmetry in fra-
chise contracts: transparency as the overriding rule, 50(8) ᴇᴍᴇʀᴀʟᴅ ɪɴsɪɢʜᴛ, 1488-99(2012) 
[hereinafter: Lapiedra, Palau & Reig] 
 92. See generally id. at 1490. 
 93. See generally ABELL, supra note 59, § 2.5 
 94. See generally Lapiedra, Palau & Reig, supra note 91, at 1492 
 95. ABELL, supra note 59, § 2.5 
 96. ABELL, supra note 59, at 76 
 97. Lapiedra, Palau & Reig, supra note 91, at 1491 
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due only to its financial strength, but is also heavily influenced by the 
impossibility of bringing a dispute before a local tribunal.98 Likewise, 
centralization is referenced in the franchise contract and – as a result of 
concrete contractual provisions – the “franchisor controls a franchisee 
through direct involvement in the franchisee’s decision-making [what 
may occur via imposing] opening hours, design and salaries to employ-
ees at each station.”99 The three groups are clearly related, but should be 
distinguished. For example, a franchisor seems to be in a superior posi-
tion, if judged based solely on the concrete provisions of the underlying 
franchise contract. However, the franchisor might lose out because of 
the low level of the rule of law in the jurisdiction deciding the franchise-
related dispute (e.g., biased or corrupted courts).100 
Even though no laundry list has been compiled of the concrete el-
ements of asymmetry, based on the cases and literature, a fairly com-
plete picture can be canvassed. Starting with the more specific ones, the 
franchisor’s power to impose arbitration or litigation in a specific juris-
diction based on the most favorable law applicable to the merits as well 
as various disclaimers101 are routinely used by franchisors. Other insepa-
rable provisions of franchise contracts give the right to inspect, audit, 
and direct franchisees via consultation or to train, impose standards, 
control, or tie the supplies, which further augment the control powers of 
the franchisor.102 However, more problematic are terms that allow the 
franchisor to act opportunistically and exploit the strategic advantages 
“through actions including franchise encroachment, franchise nonre-
newal [. . .] and manipulating the supply, advertising, and transfer 
clauses to capture more of the operational surplus.”103 
 
 98. Emerson, supra note 18, at 105 
 99. Uri Benoliel, The Behavioral Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 41 
RUTGERS L.J. 527, 533-34 (2010). 
 100. Bebchuk, supra note 31, at 827-28. Similar scenarios could easily be found. Perusing 
Bebchuk & Posner’s consumer contracts example, “The existence of a one-sided contract does 
not imply that the transaction will be one-sided, but only that the seller will have discretion with 
respect to how to treat the consumer. A seller concerned about its reputation can be expected to 
treat consumers better than is required by the letter of the contract. But the seller’s right to stand 
on the contract as written will protect it against opportunistic buyers. A one-sided contract may 
thus be preferred ex ante by informed parties as a cheaper mechanism for inducing efficient out-
comes, should contingencies arise during the performance of the contract, than a more “bal-
anced” contract that, because of imperfect enforcement, could create costs as a consequence of 
consumers’ enforcing protective provisions in the contract.” 
 101. For a list of disclaimers, formulated by and for the benefit of franchisors, see Lagarias, 
supra note 18, at 142-43. 
 102. For a list of commonly used franchise terms, see Hadfield, supra note 26, at 940-43. 
 103. Larry A. DiMatteo, Strategic Contracting: Contract Law as a Source of Competitive 
Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 727, 743, 750-51 (2010), where franchising was referred to as a 
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Information asymmetry is an inevitable consequence of franchise 
because every franchise involves the transfer of some intellectual prop-
erty rights and knowledge together with a tested business pattern and 
the related expertise.104  A myriad of tools are ready to be exploited for 
ensuring uniformity, direct inspection, and audit rights, in addition to 
the advantages the franchisor has in the negotiation process. Obviously, 
this type of asymmetry is the one most generally reacted upon given 
that wherever franchise-specific laws are at place, some type of disclo-
sure or registration is required.105 Yet informational disclosure could on-
ly partially counteract the asymmetric reality. 
The hands of the law are essentially tied, however, when faced 
with the superior strategic position of franchisors, stemming either from 
their size or financial strength, especially if they are also financing or 
supplying franchisees with goods or services.106 This, figuratively 
speaking, is the issue of the repercussions of a David versus Goliath-
type relationship legitimizing the handful of cases and claims requesting 
consumer protection law.107  The political leverage of American fran-
chise industries and resulting regulatory capture should also be added to 
the list, even if only glossed over herein.108 
Most of these asymmetries are not per se treated by law as unac-
ceptable. 109Rather the outer boundaries are left to be fixed by courts de-
ciding individual cases.110 For example, it has become a fairly solidified 
principle that “the more a franchisor controls (as set forth as a right un-
 
classic example of the use of contract law to create an entirely new means of value creation, an 
example of strategic contracting to create a private governance structure needed to sustain a long-
term relationship.  
 104. See generally Philip Mark Abell, The Regulation of Franchising in the European Union 
55 (published thesis, Queen Mary, Univ. of London) (2011). 
 105. See Abell Thesis, supra note 57, at 76. 
 106. See Steinberg & Lescarte, supra note 18, at 59-63. 
 107. Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 18, at 107 (citing Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sue 
Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 365, 373 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)). As a US court vividly described: “Alt-
hough franchise agreements are commercial contracts they exhibit many of the attributes of con-
sumer contracts. The relationship between franchisor and franchisee is characterized by a pre-
vailing, although not universal, inequality of economic resources between the contracting parties. 
Franchisees typically, but not always, are small businessmen or businesswomen . . . seeking to 
make the transition from being wage earners and for whom the franchise is their very first busi-
ness. Franchisors typically, but not always, are large corporations. The agreements themselves 
tend to reflect this gross bargaining disparity. Usually they are form contracts the franchisor 
prepared and offered to franchisees on a take it or leave it basis. [. . .].”; Contra see E. Allan 
Farnsworth, Contracts § 4.28 (1999) stating that “[m]any courts . . . have not shared this attitude 
toward franchisees.” 
 108. See, e.g., Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 18, at 247-48. 
 109. See id. at 107. 
 110. See Bebchuk, supra note 31, at 830-33. 
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der the agreement and as actually exercised), the greater risk that a court 
will find a franchisor is legally an employer or vicariously liable for the 
franchisee’s actions.”111 Alternatively, courts may hold that an agency 
relationship exists if the franchisor “in fact has deprived the franchisee 
of any real independence in operating the business.”112 Given the mean-
ingful case law and regulations in the US, no attempt to fix the meaning 
and limits of asymmetry should start from scratch. 
B. On the Unsuitability of Global Contract Theories 
Admittedly, meaningful changes have occurred since MacNeil’s 
critique of contract scholarship from 1985 on and the landscape is not 
dominated by global contract theories (whether centered on promise or 
else) entirely anymore.113 As it is quite well-known, UCC Article 2 (or 
sales law) suffers from being focused on too strongly and linked to con-
cepts like good faith, mistakenly painted with a too wide brush.114 The 
novelty is that some newer generation contract theories have reached 
franchise also, though none of them seem to have specifically focused 
on asymmetry.115  Rather, control and asymmetry are taken for granted 
and other features seem to have always been given higher priority.116 
Three of them will be mentioned briefly just to show that, indeed, none 
of them seems to have given proper answers to our central dilemmas. 
This applies also to the ‘balance theory of contracts,’ one of the 
general contract theories originating in 1983 somewhere in Canada,117 
the designation of which may misleadingly suggest solutions to our di-
lemmas. Yet, the theory does not use the attribute of ‘balancing’ to de-
fine what balanced contracts are;118 a position from which one could 
then pierce the veils from asymmetry. It is rather only an ancillary tool, 
whereby “the degree” of voluntariness and fairness,119 as the main pre-
 
 111. LEONARD H. MACPHEE, Recent Franchise Cases and the Importance of Clear and 
Complete FDDS and Franchise Agreements, ASPATORE, June 1, 2013, at 10, available at 2013 
WL 3773412. 
 112. Michael J. Coté, Franchisor’s Liability for Acts of Franchisee, 39 AM. JUR. PROOF OF 
FACTS 2D 699 § 3, at 23 (1984). 
 113. See Ian R. MacNeil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. L. 
REV. 483, 508 (1985). 
 114. See generally id. at 508. 
 115. See generally id. 
 116. Id.  
 117. See Joel Levin & Banks McDowell, The Balance Theory of Contracts: Seeking Justice 
in Voluntary Obligations, 29 MCGILL L.J. 24, 26 (1983-84). 
 118. See generally id. 
 119. See generally id. at 24, 26, that discusses the essence of the theory was “[a] legally bind-
ing contract exists where an obligation has been voluntarily assumed, is reasonably fair to the 
party against whom it is enforced, is consistent with society’s contractual expectations, and gives 
TAJTI_FINAL_FOR_PRINTER(WITH ABBREVIATION LIST (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/2016  2:09 PM 
2015] Franchise and Contract Asymmetry 269 
requisites of valid contracts, are to be adjusted in case of (inter alia) 
contracts “between parties of greatly disproportionate bargaining pow-
er.”120 
Also, the application of the theory’s main formula – according to 
which “a lack of fairness demands greater voluntariness, and contracts 
which are less voluntary entered into must be fairer”121 - would be prob-
lematic in case of franchise. Namely, franchise contracts tend to be 
take-it-or-leave-it type contracts and hardly scholarly examples of fair-
ness because of the high degree of control as materialized to a great de-
gree through asymmetric contractual provisions.122 As MacNeil, criticiz-
ing the theory, noted “[the notion of voluntariness] presumes the 
capacity to choose, but choice in exchange transactions and relations, as 
anywhere else, is by its nature pressured, not voluntary: if one does not 
assume the obligation, one does not get what one wants.”123 Further-
more, it was of relevance to MacNeil, as it is for us, that the balance 
theory fails to reach such “basic relational norms [as] balancing power 
in acceptable ways.”124  Yet the theory recognizes also that one should 
rather think in terms of “some threshold of voluntariness plus some 
threshold of fairness,”125 which, in case of franchise, may coincide with 
the limits of tolerable asymmetry. The balance theory and franchise 
asymmetry therefore could be linked. 
Hadfield, representative of the theory of incomplete contracts, al-
ready departed from franchise as a benchmark contract yet posited the 
inherent incompleteness at the center observations; at the same time 
criticizing other approaches not being capable of “satisfactorily 
strik[ing] the heart of the problem: the incompleteness of the contracts 
that structure such a complex relationship.”126 As such, it is linked to 
another major US contract theory, the theory of relational contracts, 
which posits that it is a mistake to determine the content of contractual 
relationship merely based on the four corners of the document – as it 
 
rise to no administrative difficulties barring enforcement.” Notwithstanding that the theory seems 
to rest on four prongs, the last two escaped analysis as ‘constants’ “apply[ing] to all contract sit-
uations in just the same way.” The theory is a general theory of contract even though, as the au-
thors proclaimed, their goal was only to”[specify] what the courts are doing and what they ought 
to be doing.” 
 120. Id. at 81. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 30. 
 123. MacNeil, supra note 113, at 503. 
 124. Id. at 503. 
 125. Levin, supra note 117, at 26. 
 126. See Hadfield, supra note 26, at 929. 
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used to be done by classical contract doctrines.127 Or, as Hadfield su-
perbly formulates: “[r]elation enters the examination of franchising 
through the incompleteness of the franchise contract.”128  In other 
words, franchise is particularly suitable for showing how incomplete 
contracts can be. Perusing the words of Macaulay, a contract law schol-
ar, “the real life of the franchise is found not in the contract but in its 
operation.”129 
Admittedly, both theories cast a closer light on the nature of fran-
chise, yet fail to answer our basic dilemmas: what to do with asymmetry 
and what level of asymmetry should be tolerated? The good and the bad 
is that the aggregate result of these theories is a general recognition, that 
in the context of franchise, the economic power, the resulting bargain-
ing positions, and respective vulnerabilities are not to be determined 
solely based on what the text within “the four corners of the underlying 
document” says.130 The “relation” – “the franchisor’s relative superiority 
and the franchisee’s relative inexperience”131  – also matters; perhaps 
even more than what is hidden in the “text” of the underlying contract 
itself. A further obvious problem with the incomplete contracts theory is 
that control – the misbalanced relation – is achieved not only through 
the unwritten parts of the transaction, but asymmetry introduced 
through detailed contractual provisions as well. 
In Europe, contract theories have hardly been extended to fran-
chise yet. This limit may be ascribed to the less developed and different 
constellation and orientation of scholars.132 Yet, perhaps this is why the 
analysis of control and asymmetry may prove to be more useful, both 
practically and theoretically than some of the known classifications and 
tests of franchise contracts, like the classification of the German schol-
ar, Martinek based on “the balance of power and alignment of interests 
 
 127. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete 
Contracts, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 927, 929 (April 1990). 
 128. Id. at 956. 
 129. Stewart Macaulay, Law and the Balance of Power: The Automobile Manufacturers and 
Their Dealers (Russell Sage Foundation, 1966); cited by Hadfield supra note 26, at 957. See 
Steward Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOCIO. 
REV. 1, 5-7 (1963). Macaulay found empirical evidence that suggests only large corporations 
transacting with large sums of money rely on detailed and carefully negotiated contracts. Rather, 
transactions are more frequently based on what Macaulay dubbed “standardized planning,” that 
is, standardized terms, conditions, and clauses. Here, it is often the case that the involvement of 
lawyers and law is undesirable to businessmen that would rather “keep it simple and avoid red 
tape.” 
 130. See Hadfield, supra note 26, at 956. 
 131. Id. at 961. 
 132. See generally MARK ABELL, THE LAW AND REGULATION OF FRANCHISING IN THE EU 
(Elgar, 2013). 
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between the parties.”133 Martinek differentiates ‘subordination’ and 
‘partnership’ franchising: the first being characterized by a hierarchical 
relationship between the parties and the latter being the antithesis of the 
former (as further sub-divided into three categories).134 The problem 
with the classification is that it only depicts and explains; though indi-
rectly recognizing how crucial imbalance is. Moreover, as Abell proved, 
the categorization is not reflected in actual agreements (which tend to be 
rather of mixed nature.)135 Most importantly, it does not offer an answer 
to our query of what level of asymmetry should be tolerated? Albeit it 
dissects to a certain extent asymmetry, it fails to answer concretely what 
it is made of. Using again the right of encroachment as a concrete ele-
ment of asymmetry, Martinek’s classification fails to answer whether it 
should be taken into account when defining asymmetry and its limits.136 
C. What Monist versus Pluralist Normative Theories Could Offer 
As the widespread use, international success, and some contract 
theories, directly or indirectly, corroborate: asymmetry is a key feature 
of the business format franchise - the success story of our times. The le-
gitimacy of franchise asymmetry should thus go uncontested. With this 
presumption in mind, the next logical step would be to justify it and 
state what the law should say on franchise asymmetry. Or, referring 
back to our initial question, what the tolerable level of asymmetry 
should be in case of paradigm franchise transactions? Multiple benefits 
would ensue from such an asymmetry-fitting normative theory. It would 
not only make “possible to justify and criticize laws soundly [to] under-
gird the legal system’s legitimacy,”137 but would make the nomination 
of franchise possible as well. Ultimately, this would enhance predicta-
bility and protection of weaker parties. If for nothing else, the theory is 
needed to justify what has already been going on in all the jurisdictions 
hosting modern business format businesses. 
The limits of this paper do not allow for the development of a full-
scale normative theory. Still, two general conclusions lend themselves 
to be formulated even based on the hereinbefore elaboration. On the one 
hand, it should be clear that asymmetry, so expressed in the context of 
franchise, is hardly replicated in the case of other contracts. The logical 
 
 133. See Martin Martinek, Moderne Vertragstypen, Vol. II, Chapter IV on Franchise (C.H. 
Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, München 1992). Quotation from ABELL, supra note 59, at 50.  
 134. See ABELL, supra note 59, at 76-77 
 135. Id. at 54. 
 136. Id. at 20, 76. 
 137. See ABELL, supra note 59, at 75-81. 
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conclusion is thus that franchise is a sui generis paradigmatic asymmet-
ric contract, a feature playing a much less important role in case of other 
contracts. As it is known, this may lead to one form of “pluralism 
through contract types.”138 This inevitably reshuffles classical presump-
tions that were based on sales and other model contracts, let alone sin-
gle-metric unification theories. Franchise asymmetry simply requires a 
normative theory of its own even though not fully fitting under estab-
lished global and other more specific theories. On the other hand, due to 
the complexity and relational nature of franchise, as exacerbated by the 
multitude of possible types of franchises, a single-value theory could 
hardly fill the void. More values stand ready to justify asymmetry in the 
franchise context, such as efficiency, increased predictability, admin-
istrability, more consistent adjudication, and others. Consequently, fran-
chise asymmetry is an ideal target for a pluralist theory. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article had a simple mission: to unearth what asymmetry in 
the case of franchise consists of (i.e., is it a sine qua non element of 
franchise contracts?), and could it be justified by contract theory? As a 
largely bypassed topic, more questions than answers characterize these 
pages. Still, it would be a mistake not to see the conclusions that virtual-
ly offer them to be formulated. First, not only the very existence, robust 
economic role, and international success of franchise, but also venerable 
contract theories prove the existence of franchise asymmetry. Even the 
farthest-reaching franchise relationship laws in some American states 
do not aim to eliminate it through imposed rebalancing. Rather, they on-
ly try to shield the inherently weaker franchisee with increasingly more 
efficient legal tools in order to prevent franchisor abuses and over-
reach.139 This is just further proof. Put simply: franchise asymmetry is 
given, is omnipresent, and is tolerated to differing yet unarticulated de-
grees even by rudimentary laws. 
Secondly, notwithstanding the increasing regulatory intervention, 
asymmetry has remained primarily a contract law issue. However, con-
tract theory, blinded to mainstream myths, seems to have failed to face 
it specifically. The reasons and the repercussions of the failure differ on 
the two sides of the Atlantic (and beyond), but the number of common 
concerns is meaningful, especially as the business model at the center is 
one and the same. It is propounded here, subscribing to the view of 
 
 138. See Roy Kreitner, The Future of Contract Theory: On the New Pluralism in Contract 
Theory, 45 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 915, 920 (2012). 
 139. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 533-34 (Apen Pub., 4th ed. , 2004). 
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Hadfield, that the basic question of whether contract law has a task re-
lated to franchise asymmetry should be answered in the affirmative.140 
Thirdly, it is presumed here that asymmetry can be defined and de-
limited not only on an abstract plain. A seminal, fool-proof model has 
been offered based on standard franchise-specific contract terms and 
their treatment by the law and courts. Franchise contracts are sufficient-
ly standardized to allow for compiling of such a list of franchise-
specific asymmetric clauses (with the sub-variants of each) based on a 
test of which, “fair asymmetric franchise contracts” could be extrapolat-
ed. 
Fourthly, as hopefully amply illustrated above, the “asymmetry 
puzzle” has practical repercussions for both Europe and the US. Given 
the unusually strong trans-national dimensions of franchise, it is not far-
fetched to claim that harmonization would not just be possible, but will 
be inevitable very soon. From this perspective, the role of contract theo-
ry is more than academic. Part of the problem seems to be that contract 
theory is dominated by global theories, trying to forge all-fitting doc-
trines. As life has not become simpler compared to the 1960s, Mac-
Neil’s caveat – that such global theories “decrease rather than increase 
our knowledge of relations”141 – seems to be more than appropriate to-
day and in the context of franchise. 
Last but not least, there exists a common gap in contract theory in 
all developed franchise systems which is: the lack of a proper answer to 
what asymmetry is concretely made of and what level of franchise 
asymmetry should be tolerated. Or, referring back to our initial Polish 
case, one could hardly point to a law or scholarly paper to easily and 
unequivocally answer the issues faced by the Polish judge. 
The key lesson underlying the discourse on franchise asymmetry is 
that contract theory could ease the tensions by formulating, if not an ac-
id test, than at least a benchmark, that would provide more guidance 
than the ad hoc context-specific answers of courts and the extreme vari-
ety of imperfect ambulatory regulatory responses.  This requires con-
cluding, similarly to MacNeil’s caveat on relational contracts made in 
1985, that: “We can and we shall learn a great deal more about” asym-
metric contracts.142 
 
 
 140. Hadfiled, supra note 26, at 928. 
 141. See MacNeil, supra note 113, at 508. 
 142. Id. at 525. 
